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Abstract 
The volume of profits in an economy is a magnitude, which is out of sight of 
orthodox macroeconomic textbooks and effectively ignored by neoclassical 
macroeconomics. In contrast, Kalecki’s approach brings to the forefront the 
sources  of  profits  and makes possible  their  further analysis.  In a previous 
paper, the sources of profits and their impacts, as well as the inter­relations 
among  them  are  examined  one  by  one.  The  sustainability  of  the  profits’ 
sources tends to have inevitable limits, which are discussed and elucidated. 
Given  these  limits,  two  phases  in  the  operation  of  the  sources  may  be 
distinguished,  with  a  beneficial  phase  being  transformed  into  a 
pathological one, as  the  limits are breached. Consequently, profits may be 
distinguished according to the source from which they flow, as well as the 
phase  in which  they  arise.  Taking  into  account  both  source  and  phase,  a 
terminology  is  proposed  to  highlight  the  distinctive  character  of  the 
different kinds of profits. The present paper briefly reviews this analysis and 
terminology  and,  based  on  this,  goes  on  to  consider  the  relationship 
between  profits  and  employment.  The  concept  of  ‘wasted  profits’  is  first 
presented and developed. This  is  followed by an assessment of  the alleged 
opposition  between  profits  and  employment.  Finally,  the  employment 
effects  that  the  different  kinds  of  profits  are  likely  to  bring  about,  are 
examined  and  compared  to  each  other  on  the  basis  of  appropriate 
elasticities.      
   1 
 
Sources and sustainability of profits 
 
 The determinants of profits, following Kalecki’s analysis, can easily be derived  from  national  accounting  identities1.  Gross  profits  net  of taxes  (P) must be equal  to gross private  investment  (I), plus export surplus  (X), plus budget deficit  (B), plus  consumption out of profits (C), minus savings out of wages (S).    P = I + X + B + C – S  This  approach  shows  that  profits  are  determined  by  decisions, actions  and  outcomes  relating  to  and  ultimately  determining  the magnitude of  five macroeconomic variables. The above  five  sources of profits,  together with their  inter‐relations and impacts, as well as their  sustainability,  are  considered  in  detail  in  a  yet  unpublished recent article.2 
                                                               
1  Kalecki  shows  that  they may  also  be  derived  from  the Marxian  “schemes  of reproduction”  by  dividing  the  economy  into  three  departments:  department  1 producing  investment  goods,  department  2  producing  consumption  goods  for capitalists  and  department  3  producing  consumption  goods  for  workers.  See Kalecki  M.  (1971)  Selected  Essays  on  the  Dynamics  of  the  Capitalist  Economy 
1933­1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 7. 2 See, Skouras T. (2013) «Sources of Profits and their Sustainability: A Survey of Basic  Theoretical  Issues».  Munich  Personal  RePEc  Archive,  26  April.  The remainder of this section, including Table 1, is all taken from the concluding part of the above article. 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Here,  the  conclusions  of  this  article  are  first  presented  before  the effects  of  profits  on  employment  are  examined.  Thus,  the  primary impacts,  pathology  and  negative  side  effects,  as  well  as  the sustainability  limits  of  the  different  sources  of  profits  are  briefly reviewed.  In  addition,  a  terminology  that  can  aptly  distinguish  the sources among themselves, as well as from the pathological instances with which they are associated,3 is proposed for evocative aid. 
 The  name  proposed  for  the  profits  generated  by  the  investment source of profits is organic profits. The primary association of organic profits  is with  the  economy’s  productive  capacity.  This  is  expanded by the investment, which has given rise to organic profits, according to the estimations of the investing firms regarding the prospects for future profits  in different economic activities. These estimations are influenced  by  a  host  of  factors,  such  as  the  climate  of  business confidence, the ease of financing conditions and the interpretation of market‐prices signaling, including the present volume of total profits and  its  distribution  among different  sectors.  The  estimations  of  the investing  firms may turn out wrong, so  that excessive  investment  is made  in  certain  activities.  This  may  prove  disastrous  for  the  firms concerned  but  the  necessary  adjustment  of  resource  reallocation among  firms and  sectors does not ordinarily pose a problem  to  the operation of the economy. If, nevertheless,  the excessive  investment results  in a grave sectorial  imbalance, especially  in strategic sectors 
                                                               
3  The pathological form takes hold when the limits, which may not always be precisely identifiable, are eventually reached. Its appearance may then become suddenly rather than gradually evident to the perception of the relevant market participants and policymakers. 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with  a  large  number  of  linkages  throughout  the  economy  (e.g. banking),  then  the  collateral  damage  can  be  extensive  and  the necessary  adjustment  becomes  impossible  without  a  serious disruption  to  the  operation  of  the  economy.  A  grave  sectorial imbalance  sets  then  the  limits  of  the  investment  source  of  profits, generating widespread losses throughout the economy. These  limits give  rise  to  the  pathological  form  of  organic  profits,  which may  be termed miscarried profits.  The profits emerging from the export surplus source might be named 
non­autonomous  profits.  These  are  primarily  associated  with  the acquisition  of  foreign  assets  but  also  with  a  reduction  in  foreign profits of an equal magnitude. The limits of non‐autonomous profits are determined by  the  extent  to which  the  foreign  trading partners are willing to tolerate this practice, which in effect amounts to a kind of poaching of  their own profits. Once  their  toleration  is  exhausted, they can resort to tariffs on imports and/or lowering of the exchange rate.  These  measures  can  eliminate  the  non‐autonomous  profits, turning  them  to  their  pathological  form, which  is  of  two kinds.  The reversal  of  their  balance of  trade  from negative  to positive  through tariffs  and/or  the  exchange  rate  leads  to  what  may  be  termed 
thwarted profits, while  the  lower value of  foreign assets  in  terms of the local currency might be called devalued profits.  The name proposed for the profits issuing from the budget deficit is 
provisioned profits. These are primarily associated with an increase in public debt. The  limits of provisioned profits are determined by  the 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creditors’ confidence that the debt will be fully honored. Clearly, this greatly  depends  on  whether  the  debt  is  incurred  in  the  local currency,  which  is  under  the  control  of  the  borrowing  country,  or whether it is in foreign currency. But it also depends on whether the debt is utilized to strengthen the productive potential or made use of to increase consumption. This is of  importance even if the debt is in local currency. A consumption‐oriented, or generally wasteful use of the  debt, which  does  not  enhance  the  productive  capacity,  tends  to create  inflationary  pressures  and  to  lower  the  exchange  rate  of  the local  currency.  As  a  result,  even  the  certain  repayment  of  a  local currency  debt  will  impose  a  loss  on  both  the  home  and  foreign creditors, since it will represent a lower value in purchasing power or real terms (a loss that is particularly relevant for the home creditors) and a  lower value  in  terms of  foreign currency (more  important  for the foreign creditors).4Consequently, the creditors’ confidence wanes and the limits of provisioned profits are reached when the mounting debt  is  increasingly channeled to wasteful or other uses  that do not promote  the  productive  potential,  at  which  point  they  assume  in creditors’ perception the pathological form of squandered profits. 
 The profits generated by  increased consumption out of profits, may be  termed  embellishing  profits.  They  are  largely  associated  with  a larger production and consumption of luxury goods. The approach to the  limits  of  this  source  is  shown by  the  appearance of  inflationary                                                                
4  The main difference between home and foreign creditors seems to be that the latter can stop lending and thus may extricate themselves; while the former, even if they refuse to lend, will still carry the debt burden as taxpayers, if the government controls the central bank and borrows from it. 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pressures  and  increasing  inequality  in  living  standards,  as  the economy  gets  near  full  employment.  But  the  limits  are  definitely arrived  at,  when  the  social  legitimacy  of  a  democratic  capitalist system  is  widely  questioned  and  put  in  jeopardy.  This  source  can then be  retained only  by  a  passage  to  a  non‐democratic  oppressive regime. The pathological  form of profits, which will have taken hold by then, may be termed dissolute profits.  The  source  of  profits  associated with  lower  saving  and  indeed  dis‐saving  out  of  wages,  gives  rise  to  profits  which  may  be  labeled 
gratifying  profits.  These  profits  are  connected  with  a  greater consumption  of  goods  and  services  and,  hence,  a  higher  living standard  of  wage  earners.  The  limits  of  gratifying  profits  are normally  narrow  and  cannot  extend  beyond  the  point  where  all wages  are  consumed  and  there  is  no  saving  out  of  wages. Nevertheless,  the  boundaries  may  be  extended  considerably  if  the banking system’s laxity increases and lending terms are loosened. In this  case,  the  limits  are  arrived  at,  when  the  default  rate  in  wage earners’ loans increases and the loans are perceived to have become unsustainable.  The  pathological  form,  which  then  comes  into evidence, may be called dissipated profits.   The comments above are presented in the form of a table (see Table 1);  in which,  I  stands  for  investment, X­M  for  export  surplus, B  for budget deficit, CΠ  for consumption out of profits and,  finally,  ­SW  for reduced  saving  or  dis‐saving  out  of  wages.  The  beneficial  phase profits are transformed into the pathological phase ones, as the limits 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of  the  beneficial  phase  are  approached  and  eventually  breached. Though  the  transformation  may  be  gradual,  its  widespread realization by the public of the pathological nature of profits is likely to  take place  suddenly. This  is  to be  expected,  since  if  the on‐going transformation  were  widely  realized,  normally  there  would  be pressures  to  arrest  the  increasing  use  of  the  particular  profits’ source. Nevertheless,  the  possibility  that  the  forces  insisting  on  the continued use of the hazardous source are strong enough to prevail, should  not  be  dismissed.  Most  crises  result  from  profits  reaching their pathological phase because  the power structure  in a society  is stacked  in  favor of particular business  interests or populist political forces. 
 
 
Profits and employment 
 
After this short review of the main impacts, limits and pathological 
forms of the five sources of profits, their effects on employment may be 
considered. We start with two general points.  
 
1.  Wasted profits 
 
The first concerns a neglected albeit interesting concept, which brings out the relationship between profits and employment.  This is ‘wasted 
profits’, a term first introduced by Jerome Levy nearly a century ago.5 
                                                               
5  Jerome Levy was an American businessman and later financier, who independently 
investigated the sources of profits from an empirical rather than a theoretical 
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Levy believed that profits, being crucially important to the operation of 
the capitalist economy, should not be wasted but made the most of, so as 
to provide the highest possible level of employment and output. Profits 
are wasted, whenever they are greater than what is absolutely necessary 
for any given level of employment and output. The volume of profits that 
is absolutely necessary for a level of employment is determined by the 
risks (market and any other) inherent in each line of production. The 
estimation of wasted profits, therefore, requires knowledge of the risks 
attendant on the particular economic activity, in order to establish the 
volume of profits that are absolutely necessary. 
 
It is clear that Levy’s concept of wasted profits is not easy to estimate and 
this is perhaps a reason it did not catch on. A general inference that, 
nevertheless, may be drawn from it concerns the intrinsic wasted profits 
associated with monopolies. Consequently, its usefulness is to be found 
not so much in its operational value as to the attention it directs to the 
wasted profits and loss of employment, which are unfailingly involved in 
monopolies and restricted competition. 
 
The concept of wasted profits might yet be reinterpreted in a Kaleckian 
fashion, so as to be made more operational. Wasted profits, in this case, 
will not be measured as such but will be measurable in terms of the loss 
in employment, which they cause. Given the volume of profits 
determined by the five sources, the level of employment is determined by                                                                
standpoint and in a more disaggregated detail than Kalecki (allegedly before Kalecki, 
though his conclusions were published later in 1943). The Levy Economics Institute 
at Bard College was founded and financed by him and his descendants. See, Levy S. 
Jay (2001), “Profits: The Views of Jerome Levy and Michal Kalecki”, Journal of 
Post- Keynesian Economics , Vol.24, Issue 1, pp.17‐30. 
   8 
the degree of monopoly. The latter can be simply indicated by the profit 
margin per unit of employment. Wasted profits can then be defined as the 
loss in employment associated with a given increase in the degree of 
monopoly or profit margin. In this manner, wasted profits are expressed 
in terms of their effect on employment and measured in labor units. 
 
The notion of wasted profits can also be expressed by means of an 
elasticity measure, which relates employment to the profit margin. The 
elasticity of wasted profits is defined as the proportionate change in 
employment divided by the proportionate change in the profit margin per 
unit of labor.  
 
It may be noticed that such an elasticity measure can be defined 
separately not only for each industry but also for each firm (which is the 
fundamental decision-making unit). Thus, the wasted profits elasticity 
values for an industry and, even more so, for the whole economy are in 
effect composite estimates. The economy-wide elasticity of wasted 
profits (which are, of course, measured in terms of loss in employment) 
will be a composite of wasted profits in different industries weighted by 
the proportion of each industry’s employment to total employment. 
Similarly, wasted profits in each industry is a composite of wasted profits 
by each firm, weighted by the proportion of each firm’s employment to 
total employment in the industry.  
 
The negative elasticity values for industries and firms will tend to be 
higher (as an absolute number), the more labor-intensive is a particular 
industry or firm. This is because the firms, which are the fundamental 
decision-making units as regards pricing, set prices and offer employment 
on the basis of an expected volume of demand and profits.   
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The relationship between profits and employment, which emerges from 
the wasted profits notion, is clearly negative: A higher average profit 
margin necessarily implies, ceteris paribus, a lower employment. This 
sets the stage for the second general point, which concerns the 
relationship between total profits and employment and, by extension, that 
between the interests of, on one hand, business (both owners and top 
managers whose income is heavily dependent on profits) and, on the 
other, all other employees and workers.   
  
2.  Is there an opposition between profits and employment? 
 
The existence of a negative relationship between profits and employment, 
and hence of an antagonism between profit recipients and wage or salary 
earners, is a view that is quite common among the general public and 
possibly at least part of the economics profession. But it must be noticed 
that the wasted profits notion relates to a given volume of profits (as 
determined by the five profits’ sources), which may be associated with a 
higher or lower level of employment, depending on the degree of 
monopoly (or strength of competition) characterizing an economy. A 
higher degree of monopoly is reflected by a higher average profit margin 
and, since total profits are given, this implies a lower output and 
employment. A higher profit margin also implies that the distribution 
between total profits (which are given) and total wages (which are lower 
because of the lower employment) becomes more favorable to profits. 
 
Nevertheless, the inverse relationship between the profit margin and 
employment, when total profits are given, does not carry over to the 
relationship between total profits and employment.  The relationship 
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between these two is mostly positive rather than negative. Employment 
generally increases as total profits increase or, to be more precise, 
employment increases as expected total profits increase. The mechanism 
is as follows: The expectation of an increase in profits leads firms 
(especially in industries in which the prospects for higher profits are the 
most bright) to increase production and output. In order to increase 
output, employment tends to be increased. Thus, higher expected total 
profits are necessarily associated with higher employment. 
 
Does this positive relationship between expected profits and employment 
also hold for actual profits and employment? It depends on how the 
increase in employment and output affects the sources of profits. Let us 
examine this in some detail. If employment and output increase in the 
production of investment goods, then actual profits will increase. Actual 
profits will also increase if employment increases in the production of 
export goods. In both these cases, a positive relationship is established by 
the increased employment bringing about the increase in actual profits. 
The chain of causation thus runs, in a self-fulfilling manner, from 
expected profits through employment and output to actual profits.  
 
But what happens if employment increases exclusively in the production 
of consumption goods? In this case, actual profits will not increase and 
the expectation of higher profits is disappointed. If, as a result, a more 
pessimistic expectation of profits sets in, then future investment may be 
negatively affected causing a fall in future actual profits. However, this 
seems to be an extreme case. The more likely case is, that employment 
will increase in the production of both investment and consumption goods 
and, therefore, some increase in actual profits will accompany the 
increase in employment. It needs to be recognized, nevertheless, that the 
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more the increased employment is concentrated in the production of 
consumption rather than investment goods, the greater the likelihood that 
expected profits are disappointed and turn negative. Then, the chain of 
causation engenders a slump: Lower expected profits lead to lower 
employment and, to the extent that employment in the production of 
investment goods falls, actual profits also fall.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion, is that profits and 
employment are not antithetical. The relationship between a change in 
expected total profits and the resulting change in employment is 
definitely positive, with the former driving the latter. The relationship 
between the change in actual profits and that of employment is mostly 
positive but, in this case, the latter acts as the driver and has a weaker 
effect on the former. If the effect is sufficiently weak, the change in 
expected profits reverses sign and so do the changes in employment and 
actual profits. Hence, the relationship among the three cannot be negative 
and is practically always positive. 
 
An implication of the positive relationship between changes in expected 
and actual profits, on the one hand, and change in employment, on the 
other, is that there is a corresponding positive relationship between 
changes (prospective or actual) in business interests and changes in the 
interests of workers and employees. Consequently, the relationship 
between business interests and the working class (or, practically 
equivalently, between employers and employees) could best be described 
as symbiotic rather than antagonistic.6                                                                 
6 A symbiotic relationship is more complex than a purely antagonistic one. Symbiosis 
does not preclude antagonism but in a symbiotic relationship the conflict between the 
antagonistic forces is contained within certain bounds, so as not to destroy the basis 
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3.  Effects on employment of different profits’ sources 
 
It has been noted that the five sources of profits have a differential 
primary impact on production, each affecting mainly particular types of 
output. Their impact on employment will therefore depend on how labor-
intensive happen to be the types of output, which are mainly affected. The 
labor-intensiveness is reflected in the value of an elasticity index, the 
profits elasticity of employment, which is defined as the proportionate 
change in employment divided by the proportionate change in profits. 
 
But the change in employment associated with a change in profits, is also 
affected by any concurrent change in the profit margin. Thus, the labor-
intensiveness of any particular type of production is fully reflected in the 
profits elasticity of employment only if the profit margin remains 
constant. In general, the profits elasticity of employment will reflect both 
the labor-intensiveness of the particular industry, which in the short-run 
may be taken as given, and any variation in the profit margin. 
 
Given that the profit margin is determined by the strength of competition  
characterizing a particular industry, which may reasonably be assumed to 
be given in the short-run, can the profit margin also be considered to be                                                                
for a mutually gainful co-operation between the antagonistic interests. In other words, 
a symbiotic relationship is not a zero- but a positive-sum game and the antagonism 
within such a relationship is not about one’s gain causing another’s equal loss but 
about the division of a gain between the different sides. Fairness in dividing the 
relative gains prevents the development of destructive antagonistic forces and, 
consequently, a sense of morality is important in the preservation of a symbiotic 
relationship. Thinking about capitalism as involving a symbiotic relationship between 
employers and employees, provides a more nuanced and realistic view of the capitalist 
system than the purely antagonistic relationship posited by radical Marxism or the 
consensual and devoid of conflict relationship implied by neoclassical economics. 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constant? This, of course, would simplify the analysis and make the 
profits elasticity of employment exclusively dependent on the labor-
intensiveness of the type of production that is most affected by a profits 
source. It seems sensible, therefore, to continue on the basis of this 
assumption and treat the profit margin as given for the purposes of short-
run analysis.  
 
There is, nevertheless, a qualification to this assumption that is of some 
importance. The problem is that, even if it is accepted that the strength of 
competition is stable in the short-run, there may be a systematically 
differential response to an increase from a decrease in profits. In this case, 
even if the strength of competition is given, the profit margin will differ 
between the beneficial and the pathological phases. As a result, the profits 
elasticity of employment may not reflect only the labor-intensiveness of 
the particular output that is affected by a profits’ source but also the 
sustainability phase. Bearing this in mind, it becomes evident that in 
examining the profits elasticity of employment for any profits’ source, the 
two phases cannot generally be expected to exhibit the same elasticity and 
need to be distinguished.  
 
We intend to proceed as follows: Each source of profits is likely to have a 
different elasticity and these will be compared among themselves. 
Another useful comparison is with the average composite profits 
elasticity, which would result if the change in profits consisted of profits 
procured equally from all sources. Consequently, in total, twelve different 
elasticities of employment may be distinguished and compared; five for 
the profits’ sources in the beneficial phase, plus another five in the 
pathological phase, plus two average composites for the two phases. Let 
us now examine in general terms the elasticities for each profits’ source. 
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(i) Investment 
 
Production in the investment sector tends to be less labor-intensive than 
in the economy as a whole. The increase in organic profits, which are the 
profits resulting from an expansion of investment in the beneficial phase, 
is thus likely to increase employment less than an equal rise in profits  
emanating equi-proportionally from all profits’ sources. In other words, 
the organic profits elasticity of employment is likely to be lower than the 
average composite profits elasticity of employment.  
 
In the pathological phase, when severe sectorial imbalances have 
appeared, the elasticity values can change considerably. The reduction in 
miscarried profits, which are the losses or negative profits resulting from 
a contraction of investment, will most likely reduce employment more 
than an equal reduction in profits emanating from all profits’ sources in 
equal proportions. This is because some on-going investment will cease 
abruptly and a number of investment projects at different stages of 
progress will be abandoned rather than scaled down.  As a result, in these 
cases, the reduction in employment will be drastic. It follows that the 
miscarried profits elasticity of employment will be higher (in absolute 
terms) than the average composite profits elasticity of employment. 
 
Moreover, as has been noted above, the average composite profits 
elasticity of employment may differ in the pathological phase from its 
value in the beneficial stage. There are two reasons for this, the one 
tending to lower and the other to raise the elasticity in the pathological 
phase. Which of the two has the stronger effect, depends on the 
institutional characteristics of an economy and is a matter that can be 
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settled only empirically.  
 
The elasticity of employment in the pathological phase will be lower than 
the beneficial stage, if labor laws prohibit block firings and oblige firms 
to reduce employment gradually in small steps. Though such laws will 
also discourage labor hiring and result in low elasticity of employment in 
the beneficial phase, they have a binding and hence most likely stronger 
effect in the pathological phase.   
 
On the other hand, the elasticity of employment in the pathological phase 
will be higher than the beneficial phase, if prices are slower to adjust 
downwards than upwards. In this case, firms are averse to reducing their 
profit margins in the pathological phase and prefer to reduce instead 
output and employment. The difference between the two phases will be 
even more pronounced when, in the beneficial phase, firms prefer to 
increase profit margins and prices rather than output and employment. At 
the extreme, the elasticity of employment in the beneficial phase is zero, 
when the price-quantity adjustment choice is resolved fully in favor of 
price. In other words, when the profits increase is associated wholly with 
higher prices and there is no increase in employment. 
 
(ii) Export surplus 
 
Exports may consist of such a wide variety of goods and services that 
they seem to defy any attempt at generalization regarding their labor 
intensiveness. Import-substitution, which provides an alternative route to 
the creation of an export surplus, can be similarly varied and difficult to 
generalize about. Thus, a comparison with the average composite 
elasticity is not possible. It would seem that the only general statement, 
   16 
which may be ventured, is an obvious one. The non-autonomous profits 
elasticity of employment is higher, the more labor-intensive are the 
exports and/or the substituted imports. 
 
In the pathological phase, when the export surplus shrinks, the same 
proposition applies. The thwarted profits elasticity of employment is 
higher (in absolute terms), the more labor-intensive are the stymied 
exports and the domestic production displaced by imports. 
 
(iii) Budget deficit 
 
Government expenditure consists mostly of civil servants’ salaries for the 
provision of various services. The services provided by the state are as a 
rule highly labor-intensive. Though investment goods provided by the 
state, such as infrastructure, may not be labor-intensive, they tend to be a 
relatively small part of total government expenditure. Consequently, the 
increase in provisioned profits, resulting from budget deficits in the 
beneficial phase, will most likely increase employment more than an 
equal rise in profits springing from all profits’ sources in equal 
proportions. In other words, the provisioned profits elasticity of 
employment is higher than the average composite profits elasticity of 
employment. The extent by which the former exceeds the latter will tend 
to be greater, the lower the proportion of investment in total government 
expenditure.  
 
An increase in the budget deficit is, of course, possible through a 
reduction in tax revenue. Nevertheless, this is extremely rare in practice. 
In any case, when due to lower taxes, the provisioned profits elasticity of 
employment is likely to be lower than when due to higher government 
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expenditure and about the same as the average composite profits elasticity 
of employment. 
 
In the pathological phase, when the budget deficit needs to be cut 
drastically, the tendency in a democracy is to protect civil servants’ jobs 
and reduce, at least initially, general expenses and especially public 
investment. It follows then that the squandered profits elasticity of 
employment will be lower than the average composite profits elasticity of 
employment. This may continue with cuts in civil servants’ pay aiming at 
preserving public sector jobs, especially if job tenure for civil servants is 
constitutionally guaranteed. The relationship between the two elasticities   
will be reversed, only if further expenditure cuts become unavoidable and 
result in dismissals and redundancies so that public sector employment is 
significantly reduced. 
 
In the pathological phase, the reduction in the budget deficit may also 
come about through an increase in tax revenue. Then it would seem, at 
first sight, that the squandered profits elasticity profits elasticity of 
employment should be close to the composite profits elasticity of 
employment. Nevertheless, in the case of squandered profits and probably 
more than in other pathological instances, the effect on the business 
climate and hence profits’ prospects may become catastrophic. It is true 
that in the pathological phase, whatever its origin, the economy is in   
crisis and the business climate is not sanguine. But it is only in this case 
that the inevitable correction involves a considerable and sudden increase 
in taxation. This is particularly damaging to business confidence. If, in 
addition, the political scene is inimical to business interests and the big 
rise in taxes is seen as an attack on the private sector, business confidence 
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might collapse.7   
 
When business confidence collapses, investment falls drastically. As a 
result, the fall in profits from the increased taxation is intensified and a 
vicious circle develops: The effort to reduce the budget deficit through 
higher taxes leads to falling investment, which causes profits to fall 
further, while employment also falls and realized tax revenues fall short 
of the target. There is thus a renewed effort to close the deficit, leading to 
higher tax rates and further falls in investment, profits and employment. 
In these circumstances, the squandered profits elasticity of employment 
will also increase and rise substantially above the average composite 
profits elasticity of employment. 
 
(iv) Consumption out of profits 
 
Luxury goods and services constitute the characteristic focus of 
consumption out of profits. Despite their variety, they tend on the whole 
to be more labor-intensive than the economy’s average labor-
intensiveness. Thus, the increase in embellishing profits, resulting from 
consumption out of profits in the beneficial phase, is likely to increase 
employment more than an equal increase in profits emanating from all 
profits’ sources in equal proportions. It follows that the embellishing 
profits elasticity of employment is higher than the average composite 
profits elasticity of employment.  
 
                                                               
7   This  is what happened  in Greece, where  the bankruptcy of  the state  in 2010 and the attempt since to achieve a primary budget surplus, led mostly to sizeable increases  in  tax  rates  and  other  taxes,  especially  on  property,    rather  than  to significant cuts in state expenditure and particularly employment. 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The pathological phase in this case, does not involve a clear resolution 
with falling profits but to an abandonment of parliamentary democracy 
and a passage to a different socio-political regime. In such an eventuality, 
a bifurcation presents itself. There may be a transition to an oppressive 
authoritarian regime, in which case dissolute profits may persist. 
Alternatively, the capitalist relations of production may be overthrown, in 
which case profits (as a return to owners of the means of production) will 
disappear.  
 
It is evident that in the latter of the two cases above, a dissolute profits 
elasticity of employment cannot be specified and makes little sense. But 
even in the former, if there is no reduction in dissolute profits, the 
elasticity concept is inapplicable. Nevertheless, in this case, a reduction in 
dissolute profits is quite imaginable if the dictatorial regime adopts a 
populist stance or, more generally, considers such a reduction useful to its 
social control and power maintenance. Then, in general, there is no 
reason to believe that the dissolute profits elasticity of employment will 
differ from the embellishing profits elasticity. Unless, of course, the 
dictatorial state apparatus decisively gets the upper hand over business 
interests and rebuffs their tutelage. If there is such a development, labor 
laws may become restrictive with respect to termination of employment, 
in which case the dissolute profits elasticity of employment will be lower 
than the embellishing profits elasticity of employment. 
 
(v) Dis-saving out of wages 
 
Workers’ consumption spending beyond current wage incomes, is most 
likely concentrated on durable and non-durable mass consumption goods. 
Such goods are on the whole capital- rather than labor-intensive and tend 
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to be more labor-intensive than the economy’s average labor-
intensiveness. Thus, the increase in gratifying profits, brought about by 
dis-saving out of wages in the beneficial phase, is likely to increase 
employment less than an equal increase in profits emanating from all 
profits’ sources in equal proportions. Consequently, the gratifying profits 
elasticity of employment is lower than the average composite profits 
elasticity of employment. 
 
In the pathological phase, further borrowing becomes impossible and the 
need to service and repay high levels of debt compel reduction in 
spending out of wages so that saving becomes positive. The reduction in 
dissipated profits, which ensues, gives rise to a dissipated profits 
elasticity of employment that is the mirror image of the gratifying profits 
elasticity and, hence, lower than the average composite profits elasticity 
of employment. 
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Table 1 
Sustainability limits of profits’ sources and related  terminology   
Profits’ 
Sources 
Beneficial 
phase    
Primary 
impacts 
Limits  Pathological 
phase 
I  organic profits  Increase in productive capacity.  Excessive sectorial imbalance.  miscarried profits 
X­M  non­autonomous 
profits 
Increase in the ownership of foreign assets. Decrease pro tanto in the profits of trading partners.  
Waning toleration of trading partners to decreases in their profits. 
thwarted profits 
B  provisioned 
profits 
Increase in public debt and the sovereign debt/GDP ratio. Increase in public infrastructure, transfers and social services (health,education, police, army etc.). 
Faltering creditors’ confidence.    squandered profits 
CΠ  embellishing 
profits 
Increase in the consumption of luxury goods and services. 
Crumbling social legitimacy.  dissolute profits 
­SW  gratifying profits  Increase in mass consumption and the general living standard. Increase in the debt/income and debt/assets ratios. 
Mounting debt leverage vulnerability.  dissipated profits 
   22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
